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In June 2000, the North Caucasian Chechen separatist-led Islamic insurgents added suicide bombing to their tactics in their struggle against Russia. Since then, there have been dozens of suicide attacks within and outside the republic of Chechnya, resulting in thousands of casualties among Russian security personnel and civilians. The profiles of the suicide bombers have varied, as have the circumstances surrounding the bombings. Although the most publicized Chechen suicide attacks have taken place in Moscow, most attacks have occurred in Chechnya, while several additional attacks have taken place in the extended North Caucasus region and particular the neighboring Russian republic of Ingushetia. The majority of suicide bombings, targeting military installations and government compounds in and around Chechnya and also top government officials, have been directed against those whom the separatists consider to be combatants. == Summary == As of 2009, most of the bombers appear to be ethnic Chechens, with a few known exceptions. Although some of the attacks may have also been carried out by Ingush, an ethnic group closely related to the Chechens (the Ingush bear a separate set of grudges against Russia, including Russian support of the Ossetian side of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict), none have occurred in the republics of Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria or with any known involvement of local rebel groups there. There is no evidence of any foreign involvement in either the planning or execution of Chechen attacks aside from the inspiration from the tactics employed in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In contrast to Palestinian suicide bombers, whose families are offered large cash rewards, no financial rewards are given. Female suicide bombers, referred to as "''shahidka''" by Chechens (meaning a female Islamic martyr) or "Black Widows" by Russians (as they have often had their husbands (children ) killed by the Russian army or the Kadyrovtsy), comprise a clear majority of Chechen suicide attackers; this trend stands in direct contrast to ongoing suicide bomb campaigns in Israel and Iraq, where women constitute only a small minority of suicide bombers.〔(Women bombers break new ground ), BBC News, 15 November 2005〕 What is also somewhat unique about Chechen bombing is that although the tactics used are largely similar to those used by Islamic militants, religion is usually not the cited motivation, despite Russian claims. For example, female bomber Khava Barayeva stated that she attacked in the name of Chechen independence, and urged more Chechens to do the same for their national honor. Family members of identified bombers often suffer severe reprisals (beatings, arson attacks, kidnappings, torture and murder) at the hands of masked gunmen presumed to be government agents and members of pro-Kremlin militias , although the same may be said about the relatives of all Chechen rebels. Through the first five years of the Chechen-Russian conflict (including the First Chechen War and most of the first year of the Second Chechen War), there were no planned suicide bombings related to Chechnya. The highest concentrations of suicide attacks to date occurred in the following time periods: *the summer of 2000, when suicide bombers used cars and trucks filled with explosives] to attack military and police targets in Chechnya *2003-2004, when a much-publicized wave of explosive belt terrorist attacks against Russian civilians swept out of Chechnya and into Moscow *the summer of 2009. The 2009 terrorists appear to have been mostly male, targeting police and regional top officials in and near Chechnya. Radical rebel commander Shamil Basayev and his extremist gang, Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, claimed responsibility for many of them. In late 2004, following the Beslan disaster, attacks (excluding those against the Kadyrov regime) ceased for four years due to major changes in tactics employed by the separatist movement.〔 The reason for this was cited as a certain amount of shame over Beslan on the part of the Chechen separatists. A spokesman said in 2004 that "A bigger blow could not have been dealt on us... People around the world will think that Chechens are beasts and monsters if they could attack children."〔 The bombings resumed by 2008 and in April 2009. Caucasus Emirate leader Doku Umarov announced the reactivation of the Riyadus-Salikhin extremist gang, which had been disbanded in 2006 at the behest of Umarov's predecessor Sheikh Abdul Halim. Numerous attacks were then conducted during what Umarov called the "year of offensive". The Emirate's leadership has been compelled to revert to the tactic of ''istishhad'' by the influx of volunteers, which has coincided with a severe shortage of food and weapons.〔(The tactic of istishhad ), Prague Watchdog, October 5th 2009〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Suicide attacks in the North Caucasus conflict」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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